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Christian Influences On The Mabinogi

Josh Pittman
Campbell University

T

he Mabinogion, specifically the Four Branches of
The Mabinogi, is almost universally considered
a sophisticated work of literature. As they would do for
any well-developed work of art, critics analyze the Four
Branches looking for themes and author-intended morals.
These themes and morals, in turn, are developed mainly
by parallels between and within Branches. Modern critical
interpretations of The Mabinogi have emphasized themes
arising from the well of Welsh mythology. However, certain
similarities strongly suggest that the Christian narrative
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dramatically influenced the redactor of The Mabinogi:
parallels between Christ and various noble characters in
the Welsh tales; a counter-cultural insistence upon the
undesirability of violence; and a reverent treatment of
the Otherworld all bespeak the Christian concerns of the
redactor.
Catherine McKenna has remarked of the First Branch,
Pwyll, Prince of Dyfed, that it portrays a king coming
to sovereignty and a king coming to wisdom. Both of
these interpretations merit credence; however, a complete
appreciation of these theories will include an appreciation of
the similarity between The Mabinogi and Beowulf inasmuch
as both seek to reconcile their cultural heritages with the new
Christian religion. As J.R.R. Tolkien suggests of Beowulf,
two contradictory influences play into The Mabinogi: “both
new faith and new learning…and also a body of native
tradition…for the changed mind to contemplate together”
(71). The redactor of the Welsh tales, like the Beowulf
poet, fully participates in neither the new Roman faith and
learning nor the old Celtic tradition, “feeling [their worths]
more poetically because he was himself removed” (73).
That is, the redactor straddled the boundary between old
and new, his proximity to each allowing him to appreciate
their interplay, but his separation from each allowing him to
view them with poetic nostalgia. Siewers also suggests this,
calling the Four Branches “filled with both ancestral wisdom
and ancient [C]hristian precedence” (196). Thus, although
the Christian influences upon The Mabinogi are substantially
demonstrated, this body of evidence will not in the least
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lessen the importance to the text of the Welsh mythology
noted by other scholars.
McKenna traces the mythological roots of Rhiannon,
the magical wife of the First Branch’s protagonist, thus
providing perhaps the most substantial support for the view
that Pwyll is meant to recount a ruler’s rise to sovereignty.
As the sovereignty goddess, Rhiannon is one “whose hand
must be won by any aspirant to kingship.” Not only her
“equine associations” but also “her supernatural power,
her independent strong-mindedness in choosing a husband,
and her superior wisdom” link her to other sovereignty
goddesses, “such as the Irish Medb” (317). McKenna
supports her argument soundly and convincingly; however,
she overlooks other implications these allusions to a goddess
may have had to a medieval Welsh audience. Rhiannon’s
roots may be in Celtic mythology, but in the full bloom of
The Mabinogi, her qualities also hearken to Christ.
The parallels between Rhiannon and Christ begin
with the former’s first appearance in the story. When the
main character, Pwyll, first sees Rhiannon, he beholds
a creature clearly Otherworldly, if not divine. Thus,
Rhiannon’s choosing to travel from her Otherworld home
to Pwyll’s dominion makes her analogous to Christ, who
alone “descended from heaven” (John 3:13). The fact that
Rhiannon comes from the Otherworld to bestow sovereignty
on Pwyll specifically by marriage strengthens this parallel.
Similarly, Christ came to earth to restore man, “by the
washing of water with the word” in order to make the
Church, the Bride of Christ, “holy and blameless” (Eph.
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5:26, 27). Thus, Christ’s marriage to the Church gives men
the ability to be “born again” (John 3:3) and to be made
“sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:26).
Rhiannon’s wisdom also reminds one of Christ. When
Pwyll foolishly offers to give anything to his disguised
rival suitor Gwawl, Rhiannon takes the blunder in stride.
She accepts Pwyll’s foolish decision but proceeds to outwit
Gwawl, beating him at his own game, so to speak. Thus,
Pwyll gains the sovereignty goddess not through battle but
by unexpected means, becoming for a time a lowly beggar
(McKenna 316). Christ employed similar tactics in that He
redeemed mankind by unexpected means. Instead of through
battle, as Peter would have preferred, Christ saved His
creation through His humiliation and death. He did not strike
down Satan by an obvious display of power but, in a way,
beat Satan at his own game, thereby allowing the sons of
Adam to become sons of the King.
This kind of reversal of expectations occurs frequently
in the Bible; the following are but a few examples. The
prophet Elijah experienced the presence of the Most High
God not in a fierce storm or an earthquake or a fire but in
the “gentle blowing” that followed (1Kings 19:12). Jesus’
very birth as an unassuming child, related by the Gospels
of Matthew and Luke, reverses common expectations for
the birth of an important person. The Sermon on the Mount
asserts paradoxically that the downtrodden are blessed (Matt.
5). Jesus describes the salvation at the very heart of the
Christian faith in self-contradictory terms: “And I, if I am
lifted up from the earth, will draw all men to Myself” (John
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12:32). Finally, the apostle Paul describes the resurrection of
believers as a paradox: “That which you sow does not come
to life unless it dies” (1 Cor. 15:36).
Rhiannon’s role as sovereignty goddess continues in
Manawydan. In this branch, Rhiannon no longer embodies
wisdom, as that role has switched to Manawydan’s character,
but she does still have the power to bestow sovereignty.
No longer does she choose her own husband, but marriage
to her still awards Manawydan sovereignty over Pwyll’s
old kingdom, Dyfed. This fact again reinforces the notion
that the road to kingship passes through the rite of mortal
marriage to the divine.
The fact that Pwyll must join the Otherworldly with the
mortal through his unification with a euhemerized goddess
brings to mind the concept of the Word becoming flesh
propounded in the Gospel of John. In order to become a
full regent, to become who he was meant to be, Pwyll must
achieve reconciliation with the divine. Together, the human
and the divine can ensure full protection and fertility to their
people.
Just as Pwyll marries the Otherworldly Rhiannon for
the good of his people, so Christ became human to provide
salvation for His church. The Gospel of John asserts that
“The Word became flesh” (John 1:14), and orthodox
theologians have interpreted this to mean that Jesus was
both the fully divine Son of God and the fully human Son of
Man. St. Irenaeus says, “[N]or did He truly redeem us with
His own blood, if He did not really become man” (chapter
2). The pivotal scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas also
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writes, “Christ is said to be of heaven…either as to the virtue
whereby it was formed; or even as to His very Godhead.
But as to matter, Christ’s body was earthly” (2177). On the
other hand, St. Anselm of Canterbury argues that Jesus must
have been divine in order to effect the kind of salvation and
“dignity” God intended for humanity (270). The mystery of
Christ’s dual divinity and humanity recalls also the mystery
of the Eucharist, in which, according to Roman Catholic
doctrine, the bread and wine literally turns into into the very
body and blood of Christ, His “true body” (Aquinas 2428).
Thus, just as the Eucharist, an all-important sacrament, must
be both food and Christ’s body and blood, so Christ’s own
incarnation must be both human and divine. Likewise, just
as Christ combines in one body both mortal and immortal to
effect the salvation of the human race, so Pwyll must secure
his own union with the divine Rhiannon in order to bring
about his people’s prosperity.
Rhiannon’s merciful reaction to Gwawl also makes her
comparable to Christ. Whereas Pwyll and his men, after
capturing the trickster, kick him until he has “received great
bruises” (Mabinogion 16), Rhiannon convinces Pwyll to
let Gwawl go after making the latter promise never to seek
revenge for his bruises. Once again, Rhiannon demonstrates
greater wisdom than Pwyll, this time because she recognizes
the excellence of mercy.
Nevertheless, Pwyll’s initial lack of forgiveness does
lead to unpleasant consequences for his son. The redactor
reveals at the end of Manawydan that Pryderi, Pwyll’s son,
and Rhiannon owe their abduction into the Otherworld to
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Pwyll’s treatment of Gwawl in the First Branch. Likewise,
when Gwawl’s servant Llwyd seeks revenge against Pwyll’s
descendants, his lack of forgiveness almost results in his
wife’s execution. In Branwen, the Irish nobles’ inability to
forgive the temperamental Efnisien for insulting their king
causes them to force the king to shun his new wife and
Efnisien’s sister, Branwen. This shunning, in turn, leads
to the invasion of Ireland by Branwen’s mighty brother
Brandigeidfran and the virtual destruction of two countries.
The Christian virtues of forgiveness and mercy, then, play an
indispensable role in keeping the peace.
The Christian emphasis on mercy and forgiveness is
almost axiomatic. Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, in which He
paints a picture of the Christian life, pronounces blessings on
both the merciful and the peacemakers (Matt. 5:7, 9). Later,
Jesus tells a parable of a servant forgiven of a large debt
to his master. This same servant then abuses and threatens
a fellow servant who owes him much less money than he
owed his master. Upon hearing of this, the master promptly
throws the first servant into prison. Jesus concludes the
parable with these words: “My heavenly Father will also do
the same to you, if each of you does not forgive his brother
from your heart” (Matt. 18:35). Having been forgiven of
their sins by God, Christians are expected to forgive others,
not only seven times but also the symbolic “seventy times
seven times” (Matt. 18:22)—that is, indefinitely. Christians
must show forgiveness because “judgment will be merciless
to one who has shown no mercy; mercy triumphs over
judgment” (James 2:13). Manawydan demonstrates perfectly
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the superiority of mercy over judgment by using mercy to set
the world aright again.
The concept of forgiveness, or the lack thereof, also
greatly affects the Four Branches in that it colors the
redactor’s portrayal of violence. The First Branch begins
with low-key violence as Pwyll does battle with his
Otherworldly foe Hafgan. Several aspects of this contest
warrant inquiry. First, battle is, by implication, a just
way of establishing hegemony in Annwn, the Otherworld
kingdom to which Pwyll is sent. This has one of two possible
implications for the rest of the Four Branches. If the redactor
accepts battle as an acceptable way of gaining a kingdom,
perhaps he does not actually condemn the terrible violence
of Math, and perhaps his claim in that Branch that Caswallan
has done Manawydan wrong is hypocritical. On the other
hand, the battle in Annwn takes place between Pwyll and
Hafgan only, as opposed to between two whole armies.
A comparable concept controls Pwyll’s charge—he must
only deal Hafgan a single stroke. Taken together, these two
details extol mitigated violence. The moral seems to be that
belligerents must control their violence responsibly. The
terror of the rest of the battles in the Four Branches, then,
arises from their overshooting Aristotle’s target of the golden
mean. After all, the final peace between the kingdoms of
Math and Pryderi follows a one-on-one duel between Pryderi
and the sorcerer Gwydion.
The historical context of The Mabinogi adds significance
to the theme of mitigated violence. Written probably
between A.D. 1060 and 1100 (Charles-Edwards 44), the text
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came into its own in a country under the sway of the Roman
Catholic Church. Siewers assesses Welsh culture at the time
as undergoing “conversion to [C]hristianity in a period and
manner that fostered construction of cultural continuity with
ancestral traditions of the land” (198). The Catholic Church
perpetually fought to limit the medieval European culture
of war, instituting regulations such as the Peace of God and
the Truce of God, and the Mabinogi redactor undoubtedly
absorbed this concern with peace.
Ideally, the Peace of God “was to place under special
ecclesiastical protection certain classes of persons, such as
monks, the clergy, and the poor” (Cowdrey 42). Initiated
about a generation after the Peace (42), the Truce, first
proclaimed in 1027, forbade all violence on certain days,
originally Sunday (44). Cowdrey does well explaining the
difference between the two legislations: “Whereas the Peace
sought to protect certain classes and their goods at all times,
the Truce was an attempt to stop all violence at certain
times” (44). The author calls the Truce “part of churchmen’s
endeavors to propagate peace” (44).
Churchmen had concerned themselves with propagating
peace for a long time. Jesus’ teachings of forgiveness and
turning the other cheek obviously influenced the Church’s
position on violence, but by the eleventh century, the Church
no longer accepted complete pacifism. The tradition of
Christian limited war had influenced mainstream Christian
thought since St. Augustine (Johnson 14) although just war
did not become “systematic” until the time of Catholic monk
and lawyer Gratian in “the middle of the twelfth century”
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(Johnson 14). The Mabinogi redactor’s focus on limiting
violence, then, fits into the Catholic trend of curbing the
violent medieval way of life, specifically during the eleventh
century, as well as into the Biblical theme of encouraging
“the peacekeepers.”
Violence also relates to the motif of travel. One critic
points out that danger often accompanies travel in the Four
Branches (Jones 214). Pwyll stays mostly within his own
realm, and most travel in Math entails war. Likewise, the
journeys of the Irish king Matholwch and the giant king
Brandigeidfran result in a war that decimates two nations.
Less catastrophically but still eerily, the characters in
Manawydan are threatened with violence and death wherever
they go in the foreign land of Lloegyr (Jones 214-215). In an
age less mobile than the modern, travel probably did usually
originate from either displacement or belligerent ambition.
A footnote in Siewers’s article relates that in the eleventh
century, self-consciousness of being a distinct people from
their Anglo-Saxon neighbors was just beginning to creep into
the minds of the Welsh (196). Foreigners, like the Normans
and Vikings, invaded from outside the bounds of Wales, and
the Welsh who moved were forced to do so by the invaders.
The Welsh, then, traveled under the compunction of others’
lust for their land.
The aversion to violence evident in The Mabinogi
stands in contrast to the celebration of martial force found in
comparable texts such as Beowulf and Judith. Although some
critics have posited good arguments suggesting that Beowulf
propounds a nuanced conception of violence, the poet
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certainly does not emphasize forgiveness to the extent the
Mabinogi redactor does. One critic argues that violence in
Beowulf performs the function of justice and is illegitimately
exercised when used, for example, to settle feuds (Hill 37).
However, the culture of the poem has deep roots in tribal
loyalties, which call for the destruction of one’s relatives’
enemies. Beowulf, for instance, boasts of having “avenged
the Geats (their enemies brought it / upon themselves)”
(Beowulf 423-424). Thus, the Beowulf poet seems to approve
of feuds if they meet certain criteria; that is, one may engage
in feuding if his enemies bring the feud “upon themselves.”
The poet does not clearly state how one calls feud violence
upon himself, but it seems that Beowulf accepts violence to
an extent that the Mabinogi redactor never would. Although
feuding under certain conditions sounds like the doctrine of
just war, Beowulf differs from The Mabinogi in that it sees
no solution to the cyclical violence of the age. Upon the
death of the poem’s hero, his people stand in an unenviable
position, “anticipating raids and revenge-feud on three sides”
(Hill 61). Beowulf makes no mention of an ultimate divine
justification of human deeds, no reassurance that peace will
eventually triumph—indeed, much of the poem’s beauty
stems from this despair. The Mabinogi, on the other hand,
upholds limited violence and even forgiveness. Both Pryderi
and Brandigeidfran die in the end, but their deaths result
from foolish decisions which greater wisdom (on Pryderi’s
part) or forgiveness (on the parts of Efnisien and the Irish
nobles) would have prevented, and the conflicts in the story
do ultimately come to an end.
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Similarly, Judith has no mention of mercy. Rather, the
reader is not to question the evil character of the villain
Holofernes, and Judith owes her position as a laudable
heroine to her very lack of equivocation concerning her
assassination of Holofernes. Indeed, Judith invokes God’s
mercy only to ask for strength to kill “the heathen man”
(98). Also in “Cynewulf and Cyneheard,” none of the
characters even considers forgiveness an option. Because
the king, Sigeberht, has committed “unjust acts,” Cynewulf
overthrows him and sets about establishing his own
hegemony. When the previous king’s brother, Cyneheard,
becomes a problem, Cynewulf seeks to kill him. Lastly, upon
hearing of the death of their king and kinsman, Cyneheard’s
knights reject offers of truce from Cynewulf, instead
choosing to kill the usurper and all but one of his men (3738).
Although the prospect is tempting, one must not
dismissively attribute the conceptions of violence in The
Mabinogi to its national origins. That is, the redactor of the
Four Branches did not lose his taste for violence because he
was a sore loser. Even other Welsh literature shows signs
of glorifying violence—including the other tales of The
Mabinogion. For example, Culhwch and Olwen contains
an epic description of Culhwch’s arms (Mabinogion 97), a
list of Culhwch’s ancestors (100-107), and a catalogue of
the feats of Arthur’s knights (107-108). These knights’ fame
derives from their martial prowess; Bedwyr, for example,
“though he was one-handed no three warriors drew blood in
the same field faster than he” (108).
Clearly, The Mabinogi came to bloom in a sanguinary
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culture dangling somewhere between the tribal days of
Beowulf and the feudal times of the Arthurian romances.
Nevertheless, despite the prevalence of violence in
its society—even within the physical bindings of The
Mabinogion—the redactor of the Four Branches asserts
a counter-cultural aversion to violence and preference
for creative pacifism. Whereas the predominant literary
culture apparently did not provide him with this influence,
Christian tradition certainly has the potential to have
instilled just war tendencies in an author of folk stories.
Given the other parallels between the Christian narrative
and the Four Branches, Christianity very likely had a much
larger influence upon The Mabinogi redactor’s views than
paganism or contemporary culture.
Returning to Rhiannon, one next notices that “teachers
and wise men” (Mabinogion 19) sentence her to carry
travelers on her back in penance for a crime she did not
commit. In the same way, Christ’s ultimate show of humility
began when He, though innocent, was condemned to die.
Even the Roman official responsible for His condemnation,
Pilate, declares to the Jews who want Jesus killed,
“[N]othing deserving death has been done by Him” (Luke
23:15). His passion and death express most fully His
mission to bear the burdens of humanity. Thus, just as Christ
acts as a Christian’s bridge to the Father’s presence, the
“one mediator…between God and men” (1 Tim. 2:5), so
Rhiannon’s humility—or humiliation—allows her to carry
travelers to the king.
The theme of self-sacrifice, though present in Rhiannon’s
tale, emerges more explicitly in the Second Branch. Branwen
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begins the self-sacrificial peacemaking process by allowing
herself to be given in marriage to Matholwch. By marrying
the Irish king, she leaves the presence of her brother, whose
great stature clearly identifies him as a partially divine
character. She, like Christ, leaves the presence of the King to
live with those of lesser greatness and effect peace between
the two realms. Of course, Branwen does not completely
fulfill a Christ type because she, by her own confession,
causes the destruction of two islands. Unlike Christ, who
“humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of
death” (Philip. 2:8), Branwen calls her brother to rescue her
by invading Ireland—with tragic consequences.
Efnisien also exhibits self-sacrifice in Branwen.
Although throughout most of the story he maliciously
causes trouble, Efnisien redeems himself in the end through
self-sacrifice. Because the Irish possess the cauldron of
rebirth, the war Efnisien causes threatens to annihilate his
countrymen; however, after realizing his guilt, he throws
himself into the cauldron and breaks it, simultaneously
breaking his own heart. In this way, Efnisien leaves the
story, and the mortal world, as a good character. Though
not innocent like Christ, Efnisien does make a Christ-like
sacrifice.
Brandigeidfran undeniably provides the most explicit
Christ type in the Second Branch, however. Throughout
the story, Brandigeidfran excels in his role as a righteous,
generous king. He gives his sister to Matholwch in order to
make peace, he compensates Matholwch much past what
the insult requires when Efnisien offends the Irish king,
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and he attacks Ireland only in defense of the helpless. His
willingness to make peace mirrors God’s willingness to
reconcile man to Himself by giving His Son in marriage to
His redeemed Church. Brandigeidfran’s generosity ties him
not only to the ideal king of Anglo-Saxon tradition (whom
Beowulf would call the “ring-giver” [1486]) but also to
the Christian virtues of forgiveness and mercy that Pwyll
so conspicuously lacks. His willingness to forgive has the
capacity to end the possible hostility between his kingdom
and Ireland, except that the Irish nobles keep their grudge
and pressure Matholwch to punish Branwen. He again
attempts to preclude violence through forgiveness when the
Irish build a house for him and promise to let his nephew
reign in Matholwch’s stead, but Efnisien kills the child.
Indeed, the hostilities begin in the first place only because
of Brandigeidfran’s need to protect Branwen from her
persecutors. Thus, Brandigeidfran gives generously, forgives,
protects, and tries to make peace—all Christ-like activities a
ruler should imitate.
The most Christ-like of Brandigeidfran’s laudable
qualities, however, is his self-sacrifice. When a spear in
the foot—a possible reference to Achilles or even to Eve’s
descendant’s being bruised on the heel (Gen. 3:15)—begins
to sap the life from him, the king commands his friends
to cut off his head and bury it in London, facing France.
As long as it remains under the soil of London, the head
will protect the island from invasion. The king’s sacrifice,
therefore, saves a multitude of his subjects from external
malice. In the same way, Christ submitted to execution for
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the sake of His followers (John 10:18). The salvation He
offers does not depend on His staying buried; rather, Paul
cites His resurrection as the proof of His saving power (1
Cor. 15:14). Still, as the Head of the Church (Eph. 5:23), the
risen Jesus protects Christians from the malice of Satan, who
seeks to devour Christians like a lion (1 Peter 5:8).
To return for the last time to Rhiannon, one notices
the manner of the queen’s reinstatement. She regains her
innocence and rightful place at the king’s side only after
the return of her son. Likewise, “because of the suffering
of death,” Christ is “crowned with glory and honor, so that
by the grace of God He might taste death for everyone”
(Heb. 2:9). In other words, having secured salvation for
His followers, Christ received the glory He had before His
incarnation. Both Christ and Rhiannon suffer vicarious
punishment for sins they did not commit, and both regain
their former glories after their suffering.
Despite numerous parallels, one major discrepancy
makes Rhiannon different from Christ, namely their genders.
A male-dominated society would have frowned upon
referring to Christ as a woman. However, a few precedents
blunt the importunity of such reference. Firstly, Christ refers
to Himself as a mother hen in the Gospel of Luke (Luke
13:34). Secondly, an ancient Hebrew tradition identifies
wisdom as female; Proverbs personifies Wisdom as a woman
who stands in the streets and cries out (Prov. 1). Christ,
as logos (John 1), and Rhiannon may both be considered
wisdom personified. Thus, there can be no absolute ban on
referring to Christ as female.
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McKenna’s mention of Rhiannon’s wisdom leads to an
analysis of the comparative wisdom of other characters in
the Four Branches, the first of whom is Pwyll. McKenna
interprets the whole First Branch as Pwyll’s journey
toward wisdom as a result of Arawn’s lessons (321-323),
and a footnote reports that Pwyll’s name means “Sense”
(Mabinogion 23). Indeed, Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s stories
dramatize patterns of foolishness and wisdom rather
strongly.
Pwyll first appears as a foolishly prideful prince driving
another’s dogs away from a stag and taking the animal for
himself. Certainly, as Arawn’s reaction shows, Pwyll acts
foolishly in this. The prince soon redeems himself, however,
by obeying Arawn’s requests. He shows his discerning
side both by refusing to strike Hafgan more than once and
by refusing to sleep with Arawn’s wife. His wisdom in
these two areas earns him the title Head of Annwn as well
as friendship with Arawn that benefits Pryderi even after
Pwyll’s death. As Gantz highlights, the second episode of
the First Branch repeats this pattern of selfish pride followed
by more discerning wisdom (267). In the second episode,
after the exposition in which Pwyll meets Rhiannon,
Pwyll foolishly promises too much to Gwawl. He again
has the chance to redeem himself, however, by following
Rhiannon’s instructions. Having captured Gwawl, instead of
demonstrating increased humility, Pwyll once more behaves
proudly, treating Gwawl with unnecessary cruelty. Once
again, Rhiannon’s instructions curb Pwyll’s lack of mercy
and allow him to escape retaliation—though his son will still
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bear the vengeance for this act. Gantz overlooks, however,
the important manifestation of Pwyll’s foolishness when the
prince first meets Rhiannon. Instead of taking the sensible
approach and calling out to her, Pwyll proudly sends his
fastest horses after Rhiannon. Indeed, when he finally does
admit that he cannot overtake her, Rhiannon chides him,
saying it would have been better for his horses if he had
simply asked earlier.
In each of these episodes, Pwyll’s pride informs his
foolishness and threatens to come before his fall. He claims
Arawn’s stag presumably because he assumes no one
outranking him would hunt in his dominions (McKenna
322). He fails to call out to Rhiannon because his pride will
not allow him to admit he cannot catch her. Infected by
the headiness of pride, he promises Gwawl whatever the
other would ask. Finally, proud of having caught Gwawl,
he tortures his vanquished enemy without considering the
possibility that he may start a feud. Foolishness and pride,
then, are linked inextricably.
Pwyll’s willingness to humble himself and obey
directions provides him with freedom from the consequences
of his pride in each episode. He obeys Arawn’s injunction
not to strike Hafgan twice, Rhiannon’s suggestion on how to
catch Gwawl, and Rhiannon and her father’s plea not to kill
Gwawl in a bag. He meets Rhiannon only after he humbles
himself enough to admit he cannot catch her. In the final
episode of the First Branch, his humility leads him to obey
the wishes of his nobles—now that he has learned from
Arawn how to obey others (McKenna 323)—who worry he
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will have no heir.
Pryderi suffers from a similar character flaw. His pride
first manifests itself when, in Lloegyr, he wants to fight
the tradesmen who plot to kill him and Manawydan. As
Manawydan informs him, fighting would only provoke the
authorities to imprison them. Nevertheless, each time the
tradesmen conspire against the two main characters, Pryderi
wants to stand and fight. Also, when a strange castle appears
where there had been no castle before, Pryderi proudly
rushes in after his dogs, possibly desiring to prove his
lordship over the lands he hunts. In fact, he proves nothing
but his impetuosity.
If Pryderi inherits his father’s flaws, he also inherits
Pwyll’s redeeming characteristics of generosity and
friendship. Pryderi’s initial gifts to Manawydan of Rhiannon
as wife and Dyfed as property guarantee Manawydan’s
loyalty throughout the story—a loyalty which saves Pryderi
from both starvation and exile to the Otherworld. The
redactor never shows Pryderi humble himself. Instead,
Pryderi rashly trades, against his agreement with Arawn, all
the pigs he has received from Annwn for the apparitional
creatures fashioned by the scheming sorcerer Gwydion, thus
bringing his dynasty to an end.
Manawydan, on the other hand, exemplifies patient
humility. Though the cousin of Brandigeidfran, he claims no
right to the throne when he returns to Wales from Ireland,
just as Christ came into the world humbly. Despite his
noble birth, he does not disdain to work as a cobbler, shield
maker, or saddle maker—nor would he have refused work
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as a carpenter, one assumes. When the tradesmen of Lloegyr
plot to kill him, he does not take umbrage but recognizes
his vulnerability and flees. When his dogs chase an unusuallooking boar into a castle that has appeared overnight, he
does not rashly charge in but holds back. When he has
caught one of the mice that have been destroying his wheat
and a succession of clerics tries to persuade him to release
the mouse, he refuses and presses his advantage until he
has gained what he wants. In contrast to Pwyll, he knows
instinctively to demand that Llwyd not take vengeance upon
him. In all these situations, Manawydan shows discretion
clearly the opposite of Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s impetuosity.
The importance of humility in Christianity is almost
impossible to overemphasize. From the very birth of Christ
in a manger (Luke 2) to His baptism by His inferior (Matt.
3:13-15) and His ignominious death as a criminal, Jesus
preferred accepting a humble role to exercising His divine
power. Indeed, the Apostle Paul admonishes the Philippians
to imitate Christ, who took “the form of a bondservant” and
“humbled Himself by becoming obedient to the point of
death” (Philip. 2:7, 8). Not only did Christ Himself accept
ignominy, but He frequently encouraged His followers to
humble themselves. His Sermon on the Mount proclaims,
“Blessed are the gentle, for they shall inherit the earth”
(Matt. 5:5). Similarly, He later takes a small child in His
arms and says, “Whoever then humbles himself as this child,
he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 18:4). He
also states at one point, “For everyone who exalts himself
will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be
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exalted” (Luke 14:11). James also says, “Humble yourselves
in the presence of the Lord, and He will exalt you” (James
4:10).
This necessity of humility is underscored not only in
the New Testament but also in the Old. Throughout the
Old Testament, God exalts the humble while humiliating
the proud. To teach this lesson, He even curses King
Nebuchadnezzar to spend seven years living as a beast
(Daniel 5:20-21). God also commands the Israelites, through
Moses, to spend a day of every year atoning for their sins,
so that they would “humble [their] souls” (Lev. 16:29, 31).
Even King Ahab, a classic example of an evil king, averts
God’s judgment by humbling himself: “Do you see how
Ahab has humbled himself before Me? Because he has
humbled himself before Me, I will not bring the evil in his
days, but I will bring the evil upon his house in his son’s
days” (1 Kings 21:29). In summarizing His activities to Job,
God says that He will “Look on everyone who is proud, and
humble him” (Job 40:12). The Psalms frequently express
hope that God will bless the humble. For example, Psalm
37:11 declares, “But the humble will inherit the land and will
delight themselves in abundant prosperity.”
The redactor of The Mabinogi internalizes the concept
of humility so central to Biblical righteousness and seems
to imply that interactions with the Otherworld require the
humility praised by the Biblical writers. Only humility saves
Pwyll from Arawn’s wrath and causes him to become Head
of Annwn; humility establishes Pwyll as a just king after his
identity trade with Arawn; only with humility could he meet
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Rhiannon; and humility allows him to become respected
enough that Teyrnon is willing to return Pryderi (McKenna
325-326). In each of these cases, Pwyll’s encounter with
the Otherworld has a positive outcome only when the king
shows humility.
Properly applied, this principle will also govern
interactions with the Christian God. In his essay on The
Mabinogi as a “Welsh Old Testament” (196), Siewers argues
medieval monasticism led to an “appreciation of the role
of the physical in spiritual life” so that ecclesiastic sites
became Otherworld portals (198). In this euhemerizing of
the land, the Celtic creativity that gave rise to the myths
of the gods channeled its creativity into mythologizing
Christianity. Thus, what once symbolized ambiguous
connections to a mythical world of magic now came to
symbolize connections to the Christian God; from a Roman
perspective, the Celts incorporated Christian churches into
their eccentric worldview. Given this tendency of medieval
Celtic minds, it is likely that the redactor of The Mabinogi
applies the necessity of reverence in interaction with the
Otherworld to interactions with the Christian God. That is,
he uses his mythology to instill in his audience reverence for
the spiritual, which in his time would mean reverence for the
Catholic Church. After all, the Church alone had the power
to grant or deny salvation through the sacraments. Although
written after The Mabinogi, Pope Boniface VIII’s papal bull
Unam Sanctam expresses this idea well: “there is one holy
Catholic and Apostolic Church, outside of which there is
neither salvation nor remission of sins.” Any Welshman who
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aspired to heaven, then, would do well to treat the Church
with reverence.
A careful analysis of the comparisons and contrasts
implied by The Mabinogi’s repeated variations on recurring
situations and character traits reveals a strong Christian
influence that is commonly overlooked in favor of pagan
influences. Rhiannon’s character, in its implications of
human unity with the divine, strongly supports the parallel
with Christ. The three self-sacrificial characters in Branwen
and their implications for the redactor’s view of violence
in Math, extol Christ-like qualities, especially in rulers.
The depiction of violence, much more likely influenced
by Christianity than by paganism, particularly emphasizes
forgiveness and mercy. Finally, Pwyll’s and Pryderi’s
foolishness, contrasted with Manawydan’s exemplary
wisdom, displays the necessity of reverence for spiritual
matters. All these characteristics and attributes and their
moral lessons make The Mabinogi an example of Christ’s
fulfillment of the Celtic concept of divinity.
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Anticipative Feminism in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s
This Side of Paradise and Flappers and Philosophers

Andrew Riccardo
Messiah College

“Y

ou’ve got a lot of courage to carry around a
pink book,” my friend said to me one day. She
referred to the paperback of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Flappers
and Philosophers clasped loosely in my hand, back cover
awash in fuchsia, front adorned with the portrait of a lady
staring moodily off into the distance. Some might have
reckoned the design merely the isolated interpretation of
the good people at Pocket Books, paying the matter no
second thought. A quick scan over my other Fitzgerald
books, however, revealed a steady trend. My Barnes &
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Noble edition of The Beautiful and Damned bathed itself
in soft pink hues, while others dressed themselves in violet
elegance.
A commercially-minded reading of Fitzgerald might
lend itself toward exploiting the stereotypically romantic
side of his work. Compared to writing friend Ernest
Hemingway’s terse grunts on bullfighting, Fitzgerald comes
off markedly more loquacious and sentimental. His short
stories fill themselves with young insecure adolescents
and haughty debutantes. Keeping this in mind, I never
felt intimidated by the publishers’ decision to feminize
the exterior of Fitzgerald texts. When I was younger, I
had enough blind faith in my masculine interpretation of
Fitzgerald to disregard interpretations of him which said
otherwise. I related strongly to the picaresque, boyhood
image of Fitzgerald; men often play the role of hero in
Fitzgerald’s novels. Frequently, the conflicts of his novels
involve said males feeling profoundly slighted by their
female counterparts, forced to deal with the trauma of
feminine betrayal. At times, his female characters can come
across less deserving of sympathy. In The Great Gatsby,
Daisy Buchanan ultimately chooses the boorish Tom over
the titular Jay. In Tender is the Night, Dick and Nicole
Divers’ marriage disintegrates—she running off with family
friend Tommy Barban. In Fitzgerald’s final unfinished piece,
The Love of the Last Tycoon, protagonist Monroe Stahr’s fall
from Hollywood production power is precipitated in part by
the entrance of his star-crossed love interest Kathleen Moore.
Though readings evoking empathy with or attributing moral
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high ground to males hardly stand as the absolute aesthetic
responses all readers glean from Fitzgerald, I did not have
to look far to find people who interpreted him in “my”
way. Even my own brother, who had read only Fitzgerald’s
“Winter Dreams” in high school, suggested discussing the
story in this paper, since character Judy Jones “is a real
[expletive]” to protagonist Dexter Green.
However, as my worldview continues to broaden
and I meet vantage points completely antithetical to my
own, I have to reevaluate the decision to clothe Fitzgerald
in a flowery dress. Perhaps the front of Flappers and
Philosophers contains an idly sitting woman not merely to
sell a classic to the female demographic but because she
truly belongs there. One critic has said that studying the
“gender implications” of Fitzgerald’s texts has made him
question the notion of Fitzgerald as “anti-feminist” (Schiff
2659). Another critic argued that the earlier mentioned Judy
Jones of “Winter Dreams” has been “consistently misread
and woefully shortchanged” as “irresponsible,” claiming she
is “so subtle and probing that… hasty commentators miss
the point entirely” (Martin 161, 160). When scrutinizing
Fitzgerald from outside a hyper-masculine lens, I begin to
concede that his male characters are not always blameless.
Perhaps his female characters ought to be vindicated for their
actions, empowered as they are through the demeanor and
choice Fitzgerald grants them, even if he grants them such
liberty unconsciously. Was Fitzgerald anticipating future
decades’ heightened standards for gender equality? When
readers orient Fitzgerald’s work in the context of
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mid-twentieth century feminist ideals and ethics, his
unwitting anticipation of feminist goals hardly seems an illfitting stretch.
Of course, if people posit that an author anticipates later
feminist aims, then they must provide a better definition
for how they intend to use the word and fully explain the
cultural context, historical period, and particular movement
from which they draw the term. Unless otherwise noted,
the term “feminism” will refer in this paper to second-wave
feminism. First-wave feminism refers to the movement
which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and spanned
roughly until 1920, associated with figures such as Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott (Dicker 21, 29). While
members of this wave would lobby and petition for equal
educational opportunities for both genders, reproductive
rights, Prohibition, and wardrobe liberties, they would
predominantly fight for political equality in the form of
women’s suffrage, culminating in the United States with the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Dicker
26, 31, 52, 54). This landmark achievement marked the
close of the first wave.
In contradistinction, second-wave feminism began
roughly in the early 1960s, as women began to realize the
long-term effects of leaving their World War II factory jobs
and returning to their roles as wives and housekeepers.
Feeling suddenly unable to find satisfaction in the domestic
sphere, many women pressed not only for the minimum
political equality they achieved during feminism’s first
wave but also for sociological, economic, occupational, and
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psychological equality as well (Dicker 57). Second-wave
feminists touted the slogan “the personal is political” and
strove to “extend the meaning of ‘the political’ to include
areas of social life previously treated as ‘personal’ and
positioned in the private realm of the household” (MackCanty 154). Such feminists sought a holistic equality that
overarched all aspects of practical life and daily pertinent
decision-making, not simply equality on an abstract,
constitutional level. Their aims reached beyond the mere
transcendence of Victorian gender norms from which the
first-wave members endeavored to disentangle themselves.
Among important second-wave feminists, Betty Friedan
stood out as the prominent leader of the movement. Few
voices were louder or more influential than hers for spurring
the second movement and fighting for female equality
beyond the minimum. She shed light on the various cultural
discrepancies that existed between men and women despite
the successful attainment of women’s suffrage. Occupational
opportunities remained at a minimum for women, while the
monetary compensation they received was laughably small
compared to that of men. Though Friedan’s actions while
heading up the National Organization for Women could
come off militant at times (such as the 1970 Women’s Strike
for Equality), readers should keep in mind the mid-twentieth
century context in which she lived, one in which the term
“domestic violence” did not yet exist in terms of husbandon-wife spousal abuse (Dicker 57-58). As recently as a few
decades ago, women had not attained the legal protection
they have today.
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For the purposes of this paper, however, one must further
differentiate use of the term “feminism” from its thirdwave and “postfeminist” connotations. Those women born
in recent decades of the 80s, 90s, or beyond, who believe
second-wave feminism achieved its goals and therefore
render any need for further feminist movements useless,
have been dubbed members of the “[p]ost-feminist [g]
eneration” (Dicker 107). Those who identify themselves
as feminists today largely focus their efforts on issues of
inequality involving women in particularized fields, women
of other races, or women of other sexual orientations (Dicker
110, 124). Such women are said to belong to third-wave
feminism.
Having feminism posited in its second-wave category,
one must note that this paper will chiefly concern
Fitzgerald’s role as an anticipative, proto-second-wave
feminist in his early works, such as his first novel, This
Side of Paradise, and his first collection of short stories,
Flappers and Philosophers. This Side of Paradise covers
the young life of protagonist Amory Blaine. The first part
of the novel progresses from his early migrant childhood
experiences with his mother Beatrice and prep school woes
to his intellectual and social development at Princeton
and brief stint in World War I. Fitzgerald scatters boyish,
romantic misadventures all along the way. The second
half depicts the adult Amory falling in love with debutante
Rosalind Connage, only to find their relationship break apart,
leaving him restless and wandering, trying to make sense
of his fractured world. The novel comes to a close with his
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memorable epiphany “I know myself… but that is all” (260).
Fitzgerald’s corresponding book of short stories from this
era, Flappers and Philosophers, features works dealing with
similar themes of youth. Young men and women coping
with the relational, social, economic, and political issues of
coming of age in the late 1910s litter its pages.
People need not take too lengthy a pan over the shelves
containing Fitzgerald studies at any college library to notice
the overwhelming majority of scholarship on his famous
novel The Great Gatsby. His late masterpiece Tender is the
Night has also merited copious scholarship, recent examples
of which include pieces by Michael Nowlin and Tiffany
Johnson. Later short stories “The Rich Boy” and “Babylon
Revisited” also receive due praise. However, the author’s
earliest work often does not receive such critical attention.
When critics do turn their attention to This Side of Paradise,
they tend to stress its historical value, relationship to the
author’s biography, and the vagaries of its composition (an
example being James L. West’s work). The scholarship
the book typically receives often highlights the novel’s
blaring structural deficiencies or the errors that early editions
contained due to negligent editing. Notable Fitzgerald critic
Matthew J. Bruccoli writes that “[m]uch has been said about
[his] illiteracy, and This Side of Paradise has been singled
out as the worst offender” (263). In a study of Fitzgerald’s
imagery, Dan Seiters sees “few recognizable patterns” in the
author’s debut work, emphasizing Fitzgerald’s “youth and
inexperience” and “anxiety to get his novel published so that
fame and fortune” would follow (15).
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A corresponding disparity exists among his short stories;
the later works receive far more praise despite his early
stories’ popularity. Andrew Turnbull summarizes such
scholarly consensus: “The critics, on the whole, did not
feel the collection [Flappers and Philosophers] fulfilled
the promise of This Side of Paradise. They warned of
slick commercialism, an adman’s glamour, and Fitzgerald’s
cocky tone seemed of a piece with his errors in grammar
and syntax” (234). However, his early work provides the
strongest evidence regarding his often overlooked feminist
sentiments; This Side of Paradise and some of his short
stories were penned prior to his marriage to Zelda Sayre,
keeping readers from simply explaining away his early
female characters’ strong wills or potentially cold demeanors
as the mere mirroring of his tumultuous and “emasculating”
marriage (Nowlin 63). Moreover, some of his early material
was drafted as early as 1917, prior to the close of World War
I, the advent of the Roaring Twenties, and the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment, giving readers a less culturally
contaminated picture of the author than is commonly offered
by The Great Gatsby (West 3). Ultimately, his early prose
received far less revision and therefore contains far fewer
walls built up between author and audience, affording
readers a more candid (albeit raw and undeveloped)
Fitzgerald.
When taking into account Fitzgerald’s potential
feminism, it becomes important to situate him in his Jazz
Age historical context and to use this knowledge to explain
the insufficiency of proving him a first-wave feminist. In the
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post-Great War era through which Fitzgerald completed the
majority of his writing, a profound moral “disillusionment”
had permeated Western culture due to the recent devastation
witnessed in World War I. Increasingly, people began to
push the boundaries of previously implacable Victorian
norms for sexuality and behavior, feeling traditional values
had failed them (Newton-Matza 152). Of course, vast
social structures such as Victorian morality can hardly
be toppled as the result of a single war, however massive
and unprecedented its scope. A disparity still existed
between how men and women could behave sexually
(150). Embracing the liberality of the new era and opposing
traditional sentiment from the previous century, many young
women of the early 1920s began bobbing their hair and
wearing flat clothing antithetical to Victorian female dress:
“the new woman, the flapper” (Prigozy 131). Flappers of
the Jazz Age stood independent, “shameless, selfish, and
honest… tak[ing] a man’s point of view as her mother never
could” (131). Fitzgerald’s work was certainly influenced
by the era in which he wrote. Despite having his early
novel and short story collection published in 1920 before
the zenith of the Roaring Twenties’ opulence, I understand
the foolishness of not acknowledging the complex interplay
that Fitzgerald not only had on his culture but also his
culture had on him (West 3). However, his conception of
feminism that appears in his work should not be understood
as predominantly first-wave feminism in nature. Proving
such an assertion would be nothing more than nodding a
yes to the question of whether he was profoundly influenced
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by his time. By proving Fitzgerald as a prophet of the
later values of second-wave feminism, one attributes a
transformative agency to Fitzgerald, a level of heightened
respect that calling him only a first-wave feminist would
deny him. Considering the associations his early work
has with the era of the flapper revolution circa 1922, the
economic prosperity of the decade, or the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, proving such works as bearing
proto-second-wave feminist sympathies would demonstrate
Fitzgerald’s transcendence of his zeitgeist’s mere influence
(interestingly, some critics even have attributed the “creation
of the flapper” construct as we understand it today as an
invention of the author himself) (Way 61). When readers
orient Fitzgerald’s This Side of Paradise and Flappers and
Philosophers retrospectively through the lens of secondwave feminist aims and ethics, keeping in consideration the
insecurities Fitzgerald shouldered, they can interpret him in
feminist terms.
Let us first consider the correlations between his stories
and Betty Friedan’s works. Friedan’s most groundbreaking
and memorable book remains her 1963 The Feminine
Mystique. Friedan used this work as a mouthpiece to
rail against mid-twentieth century American culture’s
expectation for young women to aspire only to be
“[t]he suburban housewife… healthy, beautiful, educated,
concerned only about her husband, her children, her home,”
thereby supposedly finding “true feminine fulfillment”
(18). The scenarios of Fitzgerald’s early works express an
understanding of this lack of fulfillment which would come
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to the public’s attention decades later. His early characters
exemplify a deep female longing for more from life.
Late in This Side of Paradise, for example, emotionally
fragile Amory Blaine stumbles upon Eleanor Savage
whilst sauntering about the Maryland countryside (207).
Fitzgerald introduces this new character to readers in the
midst of Amory’s prolonged and chronic convalescence
after Rosalind Connage breaks off their engagement.
Eleanor serves as a love interest, therapeutic friend,
and conversational other to Amory. Discussing poetry
and philosophy, Eleanor not only posits her desires in
juxtaposition to the lingering Victorian expectations of
women in her day but also serves as soothsayer to the
demands which would be placed on females by the advent of
second-wave feminism:
‘Rotten, rotten world,’ broke out Eleanor suddenly,
‘and the wretchedest thing is me- oh, why am I a
girl? Why am I not stupid? Look at you; you’re
stupider than I am, not much but some, and you can
lope about and get bored and then lope somewhere
else, and you can play around with girls without
being involved in meshes of sentiment, and you can
do anything and be justified- and here am I with the
brains to do everything, yet tied to the sinking ship
of future matrimony. If I were born a hundred years
from now, well and good, but now what’s in store for
me- I have to marry that goes without saying. Who?
I’m too bright for most men, yet I have to descend to
their level and let them patronize my intellect to get
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their attention. Every year that I don’t marry I’ve
got less chance for a first-class man.’ (219)
Astutely, Fitzgerald employs Eleanor’s character to
address other issues of inequality women faced in the
1910s and 20s, issues which would remain present even
by feminism’s second-wave era. Friedan discusses the
lengths women would go to in order to procure potential
suitors: taking on multiple jobs, treating higher education
exclusively as an arena by which to find a husband (16, 25).
In some cases, women experienced extreme psychological
and emotional duress due to the pressure society put on them
to become housewives and mothers, requiring psychiatric
treatment or therapy (19, 25). Eleanor bears witness to this
pressure. At the apex of her confessional rant, she steers
the horse that she has been riding toward a cliff and nearly
falls over the edge, jumping off the horse just in the knick
of time (221). Though this scene may appear markedly
melodramatic to readers today, Fitzgerald was attempting
to demonstrate the earnest desperation of women in his
generation, revealing society’s need for a wave of feminism
more radical than that of the first-wavers of his time.
Although, with her hyperbolic language, Eleanor’s
character can come off as immature or unrealistic, if taken
as a proto-second-wave exponent of feminine neurosis
concerning the “problem that has no name” (Friedan 19),
then readers do more than excuse her; they empathize with
her. Some might deem that her characterization and overall
demeanor nullify any feminist prophecy she represents.
However, as James L.W. West III argues, Fitzgerald created
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Eleanor’s character in a “salvaged” portion of The Romantic
Egotist, an unpublished novel which he completed prior
to This Side of Paradise (68). If critics have complained
of the disparity in quality between The Great Gatsby and
This Side of Paradise, then one can understand the disparity
which must exist between the latter and The Romantic
Egotist. When Fitzgerald wrote Eleanor into existence,
his writing had not yet developed the level of polish it
would later receive; Eleanor’s representing the “woman
question” insightfully in spite of her flaws and her creator’s
inexperience speaks to her credibility.
Threads of proto-Friedan ideas also reveal themselves in
Fitzgerald’s early short stories. In fact, critics have said
“[t]he women in Flappers and Philosophers who reject
males and marriage… are among [its] most memorable
characters” (Petry 29). In the collection’s “The Ice
Palace,” Southern belle Sally Carrol Happer believes she
will find matrimonial and womanly fulfillment through
her engagement to wealthy northerner Harry Bellamy.
Throughout her life she dreams of leaving her small
Georgian town to see the world. When Sally goes north and
stays with Harry’s family, she realizes that the cold climate,
the isolating and chilly personalities inhabiting the Bellamy
house, and the prospect of idle domestic relaxation will not
satisfy her. She struggles throughout the story to articulate
feelings that Friedan would later characterize as “the
problem that has no name” and ultimately flees suffocation
and marriage to return to the airy, warm, unfettered expanse
of her small hometown (47, 73). Likewise, in Fitzgerald’s
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story “The Cut-Glass Bowl,” housewife Evylyn Piper has
nothing with which to occupy herself other than domestic
responsibilities, an exceptionally humdrum husband, and
nosy tea- and lunch-time chatter with other housewives
(106-107). Driven to find some meaning or excitement, she
briefly has an affair with another man (109).
Another crucial component by which Fitzgerald exposes
himself as an unwitting proto-second-waver presents itself
through the study of feminist ethics. By feminist ethics,
I refer to the feminist response to traditional theories of
ethics and decision-making processes, as defined by Carol
Gilligan. In her landmark book In a Different Voice, Gilligan
argues that the classic male-based theories of psychology
cannot apply to all people, asserting that many women
make decisions predicated upon more relationship-based
approaches. The book reveals that traditional means of
judging a decision as correct or incorrect, as essentially
masculine or feminine, are incompatible with the way many
people think. Gilligan ascribes the relational approach to
females in light of gender formation at birth:
For boys and men, separation and individuation are
critically tied to gender identity since separation
from the mother is essential for the development
of masculinity. For girls and women, issues of
femininity or feminine identity do not depend on the
achievement of separation from the mother or on the
progress of individuation. (8)
Thus, women can feel a holistic connection with the
others in their world having found themselves on the
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same team, so to speak, as their mother-figures upon birth,
allowing them to take a less legalistic, more caring approach
to solving problems. Men, however, see themselves
as different from their mothers and therefore develop a
discontinuous understanding of the world which upholds an
individual’s rights.
Third-wave and some second-wave feminists alike
have disagreed with Gilligan’s assertions. Cressida Heyes
acknowledges that third-wave members feel “that Gilligan
reifies and draws overly general conclusions about women
from the experiences of only a small group” (143). Many
feminists feel she imposes her “ethic of care” upon women,
using “broad general categories” which “are inclined
to erase historically, culturally, and politically salient
differences” among women and men alike across different
societies (Heyes 146-147). Feminists from both waves
have questioned Gilligan’s empirical methods, claiming
that among the relatively small pool of subjects interviewed
and studied, a noteworthy disparity still emerged in the
data collected from members of the same gender. Thirdwave feminists have also had particular complaints with
the middle-class, Caucasian demographic of Gilligan’s
aforementioned research subjects. Some second-wavers
distance themselves from Gilligan’s work because her
relationship-based descriptions of women’s psychology
sound similar to the domestic familial role Friedan rails so
loudly against (210). In light of such hostility within the
feminist camp itself, one might question the wisdom of
examining Fitzgerald’s underlying prototypical feminist
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sensibilities through Gilligan’s lens.
Though Gilligan’s work may not sound like feminism,
it belongs to the second-wave camp, with valid work
contributing to the movement’s aims. Heyes lumps
Gilligan’s work with the “‘second-wave’… dominant
feminist theories of the 1970s which brought feminist
political movements into academia to challenge the literal
and implicit exclusion and derogation of women” (142).
Moreover, Heyes’ definition of third-wave feminism defines
itself in contrast to second-wave work such as Gilligan’s.
She claims that part of what keeps third-wave feminism’s
viable philosophical ascendancy “premature” stems from its
members’ hostility toward the “essentialist” theories Gilligan
and her like-minded colleagues hold (142). Thus, examining
the decision-making processes of Fitzgerald’s male and
female characters in light of Gilligan’s masculine-individual
and feminine-relational classifications remains important in
demonstrating how he anticipates second-wave feminism.
Interestingly, Fitzgerald will often take female characters
and give them “masculine” attributes in terms of traditional
psychology, while his male characters he will often depict as
“feminine” in nature. Perhaps without realizing it, Fitzgerald
employs a deft understanding of psychology in order to
purposively empower females and disenfranchise males, one
which contemporary readers could correlate to Gilligan’s
controversial second-wave theories on gender constructs in
moral development.
For instance, Amory Blaine never even differentiates
from his mother Beatrice to earn his “masculine” identity.
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Christened “delicate” and “charming” by his mother, by
“five [Amory] was a delightful companion for her… [for]
while more or less fortunate little… boys were defying
governesses… [he was] deriving a highly specialized
education from his mother.” Fitzgerald describes Amory’s
“tangled” hair when peering at his mother as a metaphor
of their connection, with implications far deeper than
the boy’s tousled head (13, 12). Though Amory would
develop something in the way of his own personality as he
advances through adolescence and several prep schools,
Amory struggles to become anything more than a composite
character comprised of his new experiences and his mother:
“[b]ut the Minneapolis years were not thick enough to
conceal the ‘Amory plus Beatrice’” (37). Though Fitzgerald
asserts countless times afterward that St. Regis and other
future schools “painfully drill Beatrice out of him,” the close
reader has a hard time believing it (37). Any separation he
does achieve gets swiftly negated by a quick, compulsive
attachment to other females: Isabelle, Clara, Rosalind, and
Eleanor (63, 130,158, 206). Interestingly, the preceding list
actually fails to include those females earlier in the novel
with whom Amory connectively scaffolds his identity prior
to his identity-separation from Beatrice, a separation which
is debatable at best. As Catherine B. Burroughs says,
“[w]hen loving women, Fitzgerald’s men often assume the
posture of emotional dependents” (52).
Much evidence supports Amory’s inability to stand
alone as his own man. After Amory and Isabelle have met
only once, her cousin Sally claims that Amory’s “‘simply
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mad to see [her] again’” (64). Though the author himself
admits this description as an “exaggeration,” Sally’s words
reflect the truth of the connection her cousin and Amory
would swiftly form (64). Soon Fitzgerald himself begins
narrating the descriptions of Isabelle and Amory as one
entity: “[they] were distinctly not innocent, nor were they
particularly brazen” (68). The protagonist cannot last any
substantial time at Princeton without latching himself to a
strong female. Later in the novel, after quickly falling for
a widowed mother of two, Clara Page, Amory declares his
love and his desire to marry her (137). Though she sensibly
refuses, their dialogue reveals that in the short time they
knew each other, Amory had already begun feeling that “any
latent greatness” he had possessed was linked with her (137).
Moreover, he admits to her that he has not a “bit of will,”
that he is “a slave to [his] emotions, to [his] likes, to [his]
hatred of boredom, [and] to most of [his] desires” (135).
Amory himself realizes his own lack of a self-sufficient, selfsustaining identity when alone. Of Amory and Eleanor late
in the novel, Fitzgerald writes that the protagonist “had loved
himself in [her], so now what he hated was only a mirror”
(222). Amory does not perceive Eleanor as a person separate
from himself but as a temporary extension of his self.
Opponents to my stance might argue that Fitzgerald
finally grants Amory a masculine identity at the novel’s
close. Readers might think Amory’s lonely final epiphany,
“I know myself… but that is all,” represents his belated
separation and differentiation from the female other from
which he perpetually derives his relational identity (260).
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Fitzgerald drew inspiration from writers in his modernist
cohort such as James Joyce, specifically drawing inspiration
from the latter’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man in
composing This Side of Paradise (Tanner 1). Amory even
cites Portrait as a novel which leaves him “puzzled and
depressed” while convalescing over Rosalind (195). One
might argue Amory’s epiphany parallels that of Joyce’s
protagonist Stephen Dedalus. When Stephen finds himself
on the brink of a life in the priesthood, he suddenly realizes
that “[h]is destiny was to be elusive of the social or religious
orders… destined to learn his own wisdom apart from
others” and crosses the bridge from clergy to poet, writer,
and priest of no one but himself (Joyce 162). Here Stephen
separates from all those he is psychologically connected
with and propels forward in prototypical modernist fashion.
Fitzgerald attempts to mimic this transformation with Amory
by insufficiently naming Paradise’s final chapter “The
Egotist Becomes a Personage.” However, Amory has no
creative path down which he can trod at the novel’s finale;
though “free from all hysteria” and finding “all Gods dead,
all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken,” no action is left
within his power but to “sleep deep through many nights”
(260). Fitzgerald nullifies any impotent masculinity Amory
gains from his denouncement of the world by following
his great speech with the whimper, “But- oh, Rosalind!
Rosalind!... [i]t’s all a poor substitute at best” (260). In
terms of Gilligan’s gender constructs, Fitzgerald’s picaresque
boyhood hero embodies the feminine. The author would
continue this trend later in The Great Gatsby; critic Frances
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Kerr reiterates H.L. Mencken’s sentiments regarding
Fitzgerald by asserting that Gatsby “is a man who seems like
a woman,” whose “manhood is negated” (409, 421).
In contrast, once readers see past her fur-wearing
exterior, Amory’s college flame Isabelle leans not toward
the feminine. Fitzgerald writes that Isabelle feels “on equal
terms” with Amory, strong-willed and “quite capable of
staging her own romances” (64). Of her empowering allure,
Fitzgerald writes that “her sophistication had been absorbed
from the boys who dangled on her favor… [and that] her
capacity for love affairs was limited only by the number
of the [sic] susceptible within telephone distance” (65).
Milton Stern attributes such personality “absorption” to her
“irresponsible selfishness” (75). Instead of attaching herself
onto others in a symbiotic or identity-deriving attachment,
she harvests what she can from others for herself. It comes
as hardly a surprise when their relationship ends, with their
interplay serving as a foreshadowing of the characters and
circumstances Amory will encounter later.
Deeper into the novel, Fitzgerald confers upon Rosalind
Connage so many “masculine” attributes, that by Gilligan’s
generalized gender categories, she might as well be a
man. Rosalind’s character gets “what she wants when she
wants it and is prone to make everyone miserable when she
doesn’t get it,” whose “philosophy is carpe diem for herself
and laissez-faire for others,” feeling in herself “incipient
meanness, conceit, cowardice, and petty dishonesty” (160161). Rosalind appears from birth inherently differentiated
from her mother and the people in her immediate
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developmental environment: “[t]here are long periods
when she cordially loathes her whole family.” Rosalind
seems utterly indifferent to anyone’s attempt at forming an
identity with her, never mind making one herself: “[s]he
wants people to like her, but if they do not it never worries
or changes her” (161). Despite having feelings for Amory
and entertaining the connection he forms with her, she
quickly severs it in order to accept the rich Dawson Ryder’s
proposal. She recognizes that in contrast to Amory, Dawson
is “a strong one” and a real man, her match in selfish
detachment. Rosalind admits that to marry Amory would
make her a “failure, and [she] never fail[s]” (181). Gilligan
discusses the fear of failure associated with masculinity
and the fear of success associated with femininity due to
the strain competition puts on relationships; once again
Rosalind establishes herself as an embodiment of manhood
(Gilligan 14-15). Second-wave feminists might disagree that
her marriage demonstrates any progress toward their aims,
namely, freedom from domesticity, but Rosalind’s marriage
does not constitute entrapment and isolation in the house.
In her social and economic context, the marriage allows
her to continue being “a little girl” (ironically), “dread[ing]
responsibility,” and not “want[ing] to think about pots and
kitchens and brooms” (183). Surprisingly, her marriage
with Dawson affords her more freedom, and she consciously
makes her decision for her own benefit in this regard, no
matter who gets hurt.
Isabelle’s characterization stands antithetical to that
of the subservient Victorian woman or the domestically

47

enchained mid-twentieth-century housewife. Rosalind’s
decision transcends the mere political equality women
receive with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment;
their decision-making process allows them to stand toe-totoe with men in the social or personal sphere. Fitzgerald
grants her this equity by the ironic see-sawing of male
and female characters’ attributes. By reining in men and
empowering women, he provides females with a chance
to create better lives for themselves while curtailing men’s
historically broader options. This trend ensconced in the
early Fitzgerald also manifests itself in his first stories
collected in Flappers and Philosophers.
In “Head and Shoulders,” young Ivy League prodigy
Horace Tarbox meets and marries uneducated actress Marcia
Meadow, leaving academia to support a family in New
York. To survive, Horace performs a trapeze act whilst
Marcia pens a novel. In an irony of role reversals, Marcia’s
published novel earns her the public’s distinction as cultured,
while Horace is deemed the unthinking breadwinner. At
the story’s conclusion, Horace cannot believe how things
turned out: his wife has achieved Friedan-evocative extradomestic public standing, while he finds himself the less
career-oriented, Gilligan-reminiscent sustainer of family
relationships (105). As the story’s title suggests, Horace,
who once proudly resided as “Head,” becomes relegated to
the lowly position of “Shoulders,” while his wife occupies
his former eminence.
“Bernice Bobs Her Hair” features female characters
adopting male characteristics in order to assert their rights.
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In this famous story, Fitzgerald presents Marjorie as
dominating and man-eating, acting especially cruel toward
her visiting cousin Bernice. In fact, Bernice explicitly
brands Marjorie “hard and selfish” with “hardly a feminine
quality” in her (146). Bernice represents the traditional
female naïvely headed toward the orthodox domestic life
for which she has been conditioned by American culture.
Marjorie claims:
You little nut! Girls like you are responsible for all
the tiresome colorless marriages; all those ghastly
inefficiencies that pass as feminine qualities. What
a blow it must be when a man with imagination
marries the beautiful bundle of clothes that he’s
been building ideals around, and fins that she’s just a
weak, whining, cowardly mass of affectations! (146)
Marjorie feels little affection or connection with Bernice
despite their blood relation, feeling her cousin needs
correction. Marjorie tricks and coerces Bernice into bobbing
her hair, a scandalous hairstyle for conservative girls at the
time (159-160). When Marjorie’s lesson finally sinks into
Bernice, the latter asserts herself and cuts Marjorie’s hair
while sleeping (165). In this way, Bernice places herself on
equal footing with her hyper-masculine cousin.
Critics have suggested Fitzgerald wholeheartedly
supports his character Marjorie in her efforts to fight for
the evolution of womanhood. Berman reminds readers that
“[r]elics of Victorianism are often described by Fitzgerald
as mindless, negligible, or senile” (33). Considering
Fitzgerald’s nostalgic, romantic sensibilities, such as his
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affinity for poet Rupert Brooke, one cannot simply reduce
his approach to Marjorie as belonging to an overarching
out-with-the-old-in-with-the-new philosophy (West 5).
Fitzgerald’s striving for gender equality would continue in
his later work. Consider, for example, Froehlich’s analysis
of Jordan Baker’s overtly masculine character in The Great
Gatsby.
Some readers may still remain unconvinced of
Fitzgerald’s proto-second-wave feminism or even the firstwave feminism through which he lived, citing instances of
hyper-masculinity in his male characters. Some may point
to examples where Fitzgerald’s characters wish to become
more masculine or assert their masculinity over others.
Certainly, readers can find examples of hyper-masculinity
in the stories “Dalyrimple Goes Wrong” and “The Four
Fists” from Flappers and Philosophers. In the former, hero
of the Great War Henry Dalyrimple returns home only to
unemployment. Disgruntled, taking work far below what
he feels he deserves, Dalyrimple turns to a life of theft,
stealing by moonlight from the houses of the rich (188189, 192, 199). His life of crime instills in him a newfound
assertiveness, which makes him more aggressive in his
day job and earns him prominence in the community and
the promise of a political career (which, in turn, prompts
his exit from after-hours thievery) (204, 206, 209-210).
Dalyrimple appears cold and indifferent to his connections
to the community, and yet he gets rewarded for it. Likewise,
successful businessman Samuel Meredith of “The Four
Fists” involves himself in four different fights throughout his
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life, each one prompted by his pursuit of a selfish aim, such
as ascendancy over peers or an affair with a married woman,
each one granting him experience for future endeavors
(214, 217, 223). Though Meredith excessively flaunts his
masculinity, he gets rewarded for it as Dalyrimple does.
One example of hyper-masculinity present in Amory
Blaine in This Side of Paradise manifests itself in the
character’s football aspirations. In order to become “one
of the gods of [his] class” at Princeton, he joins the football
team (47). While such may not seem an excessive act
of masculinity, the contrived circumstances surrounding
Amory’s football experience suggest a thinly-veiled attempt
on the author’s part to artificially inflate his protagonist’s
masculinity. Conveniently, Amory finds himself “playing
quarterback” by his “second week” at school, performing
well enough to be “paragraphed in the corners of the
‘Princetonian’” newspaper. His football experience
gets halted not by any poor performance on the field or
exceptionally demeaning defeat which would compromise
his masculine image of strength but instead by a knee injury
that “put[s] him out for the rest of the season” (48). Cruel
fate sidelines his athletic career, not unmanliness.
Others may still have hesitancy with regard to imposing
proto-second-wave feminist interpretations on the selfseeking behavior of Rosalind or the cold, unfeeling
demeanor of Marjorie. When people study Fitzgerald,
however, they must take into account the glaring insecurities
he harbored and how such feelings contributed to his
overcompensating for the perceived lack of his characters’
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total masculinity by caricaturing them. In particular,
Michael Nowlin suggests Fitzgerald had deep insecurities
concerning his masculinity which especially emerged in
his attempt to reconcile his “vocation and identity” (59).
His need for money would necessitate exorbitant short
story writing, and yet the short story market to which he
found himself chained was predominantly feminine (64).
Writing in the modernist era, such a reality felt to him an
artistic compromise, prompting guilt and shame over his
slim creations (59, 66, 74). Given the climate in which he
wrote, some critics have even referred to some of his stories’
Southern settings as “feminine,” evidencing how easily a
writer could betray the modernist cause (Forter 306). A part
of Fitzgerald coveted the overly masculine persona of writers
like Hemingway, and such components of his psychology
must be taken into account before dismissing his protosecond-wave virtues.
Fitzgerald’s overcompensation also presents itself
in his insistence that his characters see combat in World
War I, despite having personalities largely incompatible
with hardened veterans. James H. Meredith supports this
observation: “[t]hroughout his adult life, Fitzgerald deeply
regretted that he never clashed in combat among ‘ignorant
armies’ because like the majority of unwitting young men
of his generation, he believed that war was a necessary test
of manhood” (163). Dalyrimple from the story cited earlier
and Amory Blaine from This Side of Paradise stand out as
examples. Critics have cited the difficulty they have had
believing that Amory saw combat (West 55-56). Fitzgerald
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also possessed a life-long insecurity concerning his
economic status. As a boy, he would tell the apocryphal and
imaginative tale of how a royal family left him as an infant
upon his parents’ doorstep (Long 9). Fitzgerald knew he was
always just a boy from the middle class. Evidence suggests
Fitzgerald felt insecure in his creative self when compared
to his wife Zelda. Consistently, he put down her writing or,
toward the end of their relationship, would claim she stole
his material. In reality, Fitzgerald would take small portions
of her writing, such as diary entries, and include them in his
books (West 58). I do not report such theft here to prompt
in readers any loss of respect or confidence in the author
but merely to demonstrate the degree to which Fitzgerald’s
inferiority complexes and traumas affected his work. Failure
to take into account such occluding factors would diminish
his potential as a surprisingly anticipative feminist.
Such factors are important for scholars of Fitzgerald
to reexamine periodically in light of the dynamic social
contexts in which we live. As Fitzgerald’s work continues
to be assigned in contemporary classrooms, one must
keep in mind his potential audiences and how they view
women, gender, and feminism. Some might assume that
reading Fitzgerald in a feminist light has become a fruitless
exercise given the conceivably “postfeminist” world we
have inherited today. However, such assumptions may
prove false. In her research, for example, Pamela Aronson
discovered that some young woman today are uncertain
about whether or not they would subscribe to feminist labels
and are largely unaware of current areas of “persisting”
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social and gender injustice (903). Thus, examining
Fitzgerald’s books through feminist lenses remains an
activity which can either supplement students’ preexisting
feminist knowledge or educate those who have no such
preexisting feminist background.
It is impossible to plot the future course of feminist
ideologies. Projecting Fitzgerald’s relevance in the future
also presents no guarantees. However, some things seem to
be here to stay, namely, the varied responses men and women
will have toward literature. The other day I talked with a
female friend about Lost Generation writers. She remarked
“It seemed so much a boys’ club.” To that, I replied,
“[T]hat’s what I always liked about it.” I realized then the
power our perceived gender has on our readings and the
sensitivity with which we must approach this construct
in order to appreciate literary texts to the fullest. The
masculine interpretation which prompted my admiration
for Fitzgerald serves as the force which might inhibit
others from enjoying him. Moreover, a feminist-slanted
interpretation, which would have originally evoked my
hostility toward Fitzgerald, serves as a way others might
come to love his work. We must offer due consideration to
both conflicting sides of any given dichotomy; no one, man
or woman, should feel excluded from Fitzgerald’s rich prose.
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Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of Reality:
A Close Reading of Despair and Bend Sinister

Hannah Kim
Emory University

I

n Despair and Bend Sinister, Vladimir Nabokov utilizes
various literary and narrative devices to study consciousness.
Symbolism, unreliable narrators, and artifice present a
literary reality that invites the readers to observe how each
character’s consciousness builds the world it perceives. We
are also exposed to different consciousness’ imperfections
through which we are encouraged to reflect on our own
mental and psychological inclinations. In the end, Nabokov
points to the entirely individualistic and subjective nature
of truth and suggests that we might never objectively know
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Truth or Reality because everything we know and perceive
is filtered through a biased mind. Instead, he stresses the
importance of being aware of the necessarily unique way
everyone perceives the world.
In Despair, mirrors symbolize the distorted way
consciousness often perceives and interprets the world.
“For Nabokov,” Ellen Pifer comments, “the world is not an
objective entity but a universe embraced by consciousness”
(127). In other words, reality does not exist apart from
the mind that encounters it, and Nabokov compares
consciousness to a mirror because the world we perceive is
reflective of our inner world just as a mirror merely reflects
what is before it. A distorted consciousness, like a colored
mirror, produces a misrepresented version of reality that
is colored by certain beliefs, emotions, and prejudices.
Mirrors also don’t change shape unless shattered; comparing
our mind to a mirror thus attests to our consciousness’
stubbornness as well.
Within the novel, Hermann’s consciousness is colored
by his unwavering belief that he has found his doppelgänger,
and this causes Hermann to see the world entirely differently
from everyone else. It is interesting to note that he dislikes
mirrors. “Now that is a word I loathe, that ghastly thing!”
exclaims Hermann, and he even writes that “the merely
mention of it has just given [him] a nasty shock” (Despair
27). Instead of seeing himself and the world as it really is,
he relies on his own mind which repeatedly produces false
doubles. Colored by his belief in a doppelgänger, Hermann
imagines Felix to be his mirror image when really it is only
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his consciousness reflecting distorted images: “for some ten
seconds we kept looking into each other’s eyes. Slowly I
raised my right arm, but his left did not rise, as I had almost
expected to do. I closed my left eye, but both his eyes
remained open” (Despair 20). When he does encounter a
true mirror, Hermann convinces himself that the reflection
he sees is not himself, but Felix: “when at last I got back to
my hotel room, I found there, amid mercurial shadows and
framed in frizzly bronze, Felix awaiting me. Pale-faced and
solemn he drew near. He was now well-shaven” (Despair
22).
Hermann’s repeated denial of Felix’s uniqueness
dramatizes the subjective nature of reality in Despair. We see
that Hermann had been aware of their physical differences
from the beginning:
I possess large yellowish teeth; his are whiter and set
more closely together, but is that really important?
On my forehead a vein stands out like a capital M
imperfectly drawn, but when I sleep my brow is as
smooth as that of my double. And those ears… the
convolutions of his are but very slightly altered in
comparison with mine: here more compressed, there
smoothed out. We have eyes of the same shape,
narrowly slit with sparse lashes, but his iris is paler
than mine. (Despair 24)
Though he himself observes certain facial differences,
Hermann insists that they are the same person. Again and
again he considers the possibility that Felix might not
be his double—“who knows, maybe he was not the least
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like me after all” — but Hermann always returns to his
original disposition (Despair 88). His ability to perceive
Felix as his double while contrary evidence abound shows
that “every item perceived by Nabokov’s narrators and
protagonists similarly acts as a mirror of the observation of
consciousness” (Pifer 127). In other words, what Hermann
sees and fails to see are not indicative of what his sensory
abilities are capable of, but what his consciousness is
desirous of. This is why Hermann’s use of the phrase “to
my eyes” is so important because it was his desire to see a
doppelgänger that his eyes responded to (Despair 21).
Hermann believing Felix to be his identical twin is
not an isolated, one-time mistake because we see that his
consciousness idealizes doubles and produces them over
and over again. When travelling through a foreign town
to meet Felix again, Hermann comes across what he takes
to be one of Ardalion’s pictures and asks the store owner
how she came to attain it. When she replies that her niece
painted it, Hermann thinks “[W]ell, I’m damned! For had
I not seen something very similar, if not identical, among
Ardalion’s pictures?” (Despair 65) However, Hermann later
discovers that the painting’s subjects are “not quite two
roses and not quite a pipe, but a couple of large peaches
and a glass ashtray” (Despair 93). Similarly, Hermann is
prone to thinking that every face looks, more or less, the
same. When Ardalion asserts that “every face is unique,”
Hermann retorts “Well, now, really—unique! … Isn’t that
going too far? Take for instance the definite types of human
faces that exist in the world; say, zoological types. There are
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people with the features of apes; there is also the rat type,
the swine type. Then take the resemblance to celebrities…”
(Despair 43). Instead of perceiving individual differences
in people, Hermann is busy categorizing. When he shares
that he “longed passionately for [Ardalion] to start talking
about doubles,” we observe that mirror image is a deeprooted obsession with Hermann—a tint to his mirror of
consciousness (Despair 43).
In addition to mirror symbolisms, Nabokov also employs
an unreliable narrator to further suggest that consciousness
is often misleading. In the introduction of Despair, Nabokov
calls Hermann, our lying and exaggerating narrator, a
“neurotic scoundrel” (Despair 11). From the very first
sentence of the novel we can see Hermann’s inconsistent
personality: “If I were not perfectly sure of my power to
write and of my marvelous ability to express ideas with the
utmost grace and vividness… So, more or less, I had thought
of beginning of my tale” (Despair 13). The sentence lacks
the “utmost grace” and logic that Hermann professes to
possess, and the awkward phrases such as “well, as I was
saying” and “I think I ought to inform the reader” insinuate
that Hermann is not, in fact, perfectly sure of his literary
talent (Despair 14). We also see that Hermann has no qualms
about lying when he confesses, “[T]hat bit about my mother
was a deliberate lie […] I could, of course have crossed it
out, but I purposely leave it there as a sample of one of my
essential traits: my light-hearted, inspired lying” (Despair
14). Lastly, Hermann seems to acknowledge that his writing
is imperfect and unreliable because he is writing from
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memory:
The pines sought gently, snow lay about, with bald
patches of soil showing black. What nonsense! How
could there by snow in June? Ought to be crossed
out, were it not wicked to erase; for the real author
is not I, but my impatient
memory. Understand
it just as you please; it is none of my business.
(Despair 41)
It is particularly insightful for Hermann to have noticed
that it is not his being itself narrating but his flawed and
biased memory retracing the story. Indeed, it is our unique
consciousness that stumbles upon the world to make sense
of whatever it encounters. Furthermore, since all minds have
different inclinations, bias and errors are to be expected.
Lastly, Nabokov uses humorous cases of extreme
situational irony to convey how the folly of our
consciousness can be comical at times. To the end Hermann
refuses to believe that his “art,” or the foolish murder of
Felix, has failed because he and Felix bear no resemblance.
Instead, he complains,“[A]ll that disgusting mess is due
to the inertia, pigheadedness, prejudice of humans, failing
to recognize me in the corpse of my flawless double”
(Despair 162). Of course, this is extremely ironic because
it was precisely this stubborn bias of his mind that led him
to his demise. Similarly, when first encountering Felix,
Hermann comments that it would only be “the partiality
and fallaciousness of human eyesight” that would lead
others to miss their resemblance (Despair 19). Through
these comically ironic situations, Nabokov comments on the
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inherent difficulty consciousness faces in becoming aware of
its own limitations.
If mirrors in Despair express consciousness’ tendency
to project whatever is already within itself, liquids in Bend
Sinister reflect consciousness’ fluid nature. The motif of
liquid blots reoccurs throughout the novel. The very first
scene in the book contains an oblong puddle, and the
subsequent chapter takes place over a bridge where Krug
feels “an intimate connection with the black lacquered
water lapping and heaving under the stone arches of the
bridge” (Bend Sinister 14). Here, the black “heaving” water
seems to reflect Krug’s own self, a gloomy man who had
been crying and struggling. The liquid imagery returns
again when Dr. Alexander’s pen bleeds ink and Krug sees
the ink blot, “a fancy footprint or the spatulate outline of a
puddle” (Bend Sinister 50). Lastly, Skotoma, the founder of
Ekwilism, makes explicit the comparison between human
consciousness, liquid, and container:
Human beings, he said, were so many vessels
containing unequal portions of this essentially
uniform consciousness. It was, however, quite
possible, he maintained, to regulate the capacity
of the human vessels […] either by grading the
contents or by eliminating the fancy vessels and
adopting a standard size. (Bend Sinister 68)
Because he believed consciousness to be fluid and
malleable, Skotoma strove to regulate the shape of
consciousness by limiting the “vessels”—people’s beliefs,
emotions, and expressions.
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In Krug’s case, everything he experiences is molded
according to his prevailing grief, just as everything Hermann
sees is colored by his belief in a doppelgänger. Krug asserts
in the beginning that “the operation has not been successful
and [that his] wife will die” (Bend Sinister 6). The despair
resulting from this tragic occasion proceeds to affect
everything Krug observes. For instance, illusions of Olga
flash across Krug’s mind while he is crossing the bridge:
“Suddenly, with the vividness of a praedormital image or
of a bright-robed lady on stained glass, she drifted across
his retina, in profile, carrying something[…] and the wall
dissolved, the torrent was loosed again” (Bend Sinister 13).
The ink blot Krug observes from Dr. Alexander’s pen takes
the shape of a puddle, the first thing Krug observed when
looking outside the hospital window after Olga’s death.
Similarly, when Paduk spills milk by knocking down the
tumbler, “what was left of the milk made a kidney-shaped
white puddle on the desk” (Bend Sinister 132). Kidney
failure, of course, was the cause of Olga’s death, and the
puddle image returns again and again. “The world Krug
perceives,” Pifer explains, “is a psychic landscape, centered
about his own preoccupations and concerns […] Everything
Krug perceives is transmuted and infused by the grief, the
love, the loss he experiences at Olga’s death” (81). Thus
in Bend Sinister, the ever-conforming liquid motif reveals
the workings of Krug’s consciousness— his affected mind
whose perception of the world is conditioned by his despair.
Furthermore, by suggesting that it was Krug’s
mental state that brought about his own demise, Nabokov
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points to the danger of not being aware of the way one’s
consciousness interprets the world. As an academic, Krug
is always trying to reason the world out, and he fails to
understand the brutality of the Ekwilist regime simply
because he does not perceive its legitimacy. “My dear
friend, you know well my esteem for you,” President
Azureus pleads, “but you are a dreamer, a thinker. You do
not realize the circumstances” (Bend Sinister 47). Instead
of considering the dangers of Paduk’s regime, Krug holds
onto his stubborn belief that he is somehow untouchable.
His obliviousness is a partial result of his childhood
memory of bullying Paduk. Krug recalls that “toad was
[Paduk’s] nickname,” confessing that he was “something
of a bully” who used to “trip [Paduk] up and sit upon his
face” (Bend Sinister 46). Krug’s heavy reliance on the past
manifests itself through his unwillingness to pay the proper
respect to Paduk during his interview. Alarmed by Krug’s
condescending manner, the surrounding guards warn that
“this is still not the right manner” and that he “should bear in
mind that notwithstanding the narrow and fragile bridge of
school memories uniting the two sides, these are separated
in depth by an abyss of power and dignity which even a
great philosopher cannot hope to measure” (Bend Sinister
129). Though he is ordered not to “indulge in this atrocious
familiarity,” Krug continues to anger Paduk and the guards
(Bend Sinister 129).
Krug’s pride, philosophic tendencies, and apathy make
it difficult for Krug to protect himself and David from
Paduk’s totalitarian government. Indeed, Krug is unable
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to foresee David’s impending danger despite the obvious
hints. Entrenched in his own perception of reality, Krug
entirely disregards others’ reality—Paduk’s and President
Azerues’, among others— and brings about his own
tragic end. Laurie Clancy aptly observes that “although
[Nabokov’s] sympathies are patently with Krug, the author
is nevertheless careful to point out the flaws in Krug’s
greatness—his arrogance and foolish conviction of his own
safety and failure to see how his presence endangers his
friends” (96). For instance, though Krug has had the chance
to escape the country, he delays for no apparent reason. By
blinding Krug to the well-apparent fact that Mariette is a spy,
Nabokov exposes how illogical our minds can be when we
are insistent upon our own reality. The able reader is quick to
pick up on Marietta’s suspicious motives given that she had
worked for a well-known artist until he suddenly was sent to
a prison camp, not to mention that she randomly shows up at
Krug’s door. Even Krug’s intuition seems to respond to these
hints when he comments that “there was something rather
irritating about her,” but he fails to act upon it (Bend Sinister
123). Thus Nabokov suggests that it is not enough merely to
know that our consciousness is biased; one should at least
have a faint idea of one’s own inclinations if one wishes to
avoid Hermann and Krug’s fate.
Nabokov also dramatizes the unreliable and artificial
nature of reality in Bend Sinister by robbing his characters
of autonomy; the use of artifice reminds the reader that there
is no objective reality. The narrator repeatedly makes his
presence felt by calling Krug his “favorite character” and
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by employing changes in narrative voices (135). The reality
in Bend Sinister is full of shifting perspectives. Whereas
the first chapter begins with Krug’s first-person narrative,
the second chapter switches to an omniscient third person
narrator that observes Krug. The change in gaze, voice, and
awareness between “my wife will die” and “Krug halted
in the doorway” conveys that there are always at least two
different angles to any given reality (Bend Sinister 7). The
shifting identity of narrative voices makes it difficult for
the reader to clearly distinguish between what is real and
what is imagined in the novel (Clancy 95). The narrator
also provides the reader with multiple versions of the story;
after describing Krug’s meeting with Paduk, the narrator
interrupts, “[N]o, it did not go on quite like that. In the
first place Paduk was silent during most of the interview”
(Bend Sinister 131). Nabokov even addresses Krug directly
towards the end of the novel when he writes: “the echoing
steps retreated. Silence. Now, at last, you may think” (202).
By repeatedly disrupting the seemingly real world of Bend
Sinister, Nabokov suggests that the world we live in, like
Krug’s world, is entirely dependent on human consciousness.
The biggest authorial intervention occurs at the end of
the novel when Krug finds that he is a mere character at the
whim of the narrator, and it is important for us to note that
our position is not too different from Krug’s; we, too, are
at the whims of the universe and our own consciousness
and will therefore never truly and objectively understand
reality. Towards the end of Bend Sinister, the narrator shares
that he “felt a pang of pity for Adam and slid towards him
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along an inclined beam of pale light—causing instantaneous
madness” (203). This madness opens Krug’s eyes to the
“simple reality” that “he and his son and wife and everybody
else are merely [Nabokov]’s whims,” that everything is “only
absurd mirages, illusions oppressive to Krug during his brief
spell of being” (Bend Sinister vii). Aware of the true nature
of his existence, Krug cries, “[Y]ou silly people […] what on
earth are you afraid of? What does it all matter? Ridiculous!
Same as those infantile pleasures—Olga and the boy taking
part in some silly theatricals, she getting drowned, he losing
his life or something in a railway accident. What on earth
does it matter?” (Bend Sinister 206) The narrator even saves
Krug from dying by suddenly putting an end to the novel,
an artifice Nabokov describes as “slippery sophism, a play
upon words” (210). However, Nabokov does not employ
these extreme interventions solely to exercise his omnipotent
power as the creator or even to take the easy way out.
Instead, by using artifice to create a dream-like world where
illusion and reality overlap, Nabokov invites the reader to
compare his reality to that of Krug’s:
The origins of our existence are ultimately
mysterious, remaining beyond the reach of the words
we summon to define and describe. Hedged by the
unknown surrounding us, we struggle, like Adam
Krug, to peer beyond the limits of our condition,
seeking to populate the terrifyingly empty spaces
with our words and images. (Pifer 95)
By witnessing Krug’s lack of autonomy, we become
aware of the possibility that our reality, too, is never
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concrete, independent, and objective.
In the end, symbolism, unreliable narrators, and
artifice in Despair and Bend Sinister show that life is a
series of biased impressions and that every consciousness
is necessarily singular. Each consciousness builds the
individual’s world, and this is why the unique nature of
consciousness is crucial; there is no such thing as average
reality because our subjective minds render it impossible
for us to grasp the objective truth—if there is any at all.
Both novels uphold the supremacy of the individual
consciousness, no matter how imperfect it may be. Lastly,
because each individual consciousness is unique, to ignore
or suppress someone’s consciousness is to wipe out his or
her world and existence. Nabokov seems to speak directly
through Ardalion in Despair: “in the whole world there
are not, and cannot be, two men alike, however well you
disguise them” (Despair 170). Nabokov defends every
consciousness’ singularity, and it is only the deranged or the
evil—such as Hermann and Paduk— who believe in true
doubles.
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